POPQAE 43(3) 285–442 (1979)
ISSN 0033–362X

A0610 1

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FALL 1979

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Volume #43, 4 issues (1979)

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Mail orders and direct subscription information to:
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Single copy and back volume information furnished upon written request. Claims for missing issues can be honored only up to three months from date of issue. Indexed by Public Affairs Information Services, Social Sciences Index, United States Political Science Documents, and Combined Retrospective Index Sets (CRIS).

PUBLICATION NUMBER 449380

Editorial Office: Journalism Building, Columbia University 116th Street and Broadway, New York, New York 10027
Business, Subscriptions, Back Issues: Elsevier North Holland, Inc. 52 Vanderbilt Avenue New York, New York 10017
AAPOR: Post Office Box 17, Princeton, New Jersey 08540
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Creating a Crisis: German Mass Media and Oil Supply in 1973–74 *Hans Mathias Kepplinger and Herbert Roth* 285

Why Is Turnout Down? *Howard L. Reiter* 297

Certain Problems in Election Survey Methodology *Paul Perry* 312

Learning About the Candidates: The 1976 Presidential Debates *Arthur H. Miller and Michael MacKuen* 326

The "Positivity Bias" in Evaluations of Public Figures: Evidence Against Instrument Artifacts *Richard R. Lau, David O. Sears and Richard Centers* 347

Response Validity in Surveys of Voting Behavior *Michael W. Traugott and John P. Katosh* 359

The Consequences of Large Monetary Incentives in Mail Surveys of Elites *R. Kenneth Godwin* 378

CURRENT RESEARCH

The Effects of Newspaper Endorsements on Election Outcomes: A Case Study *Howard A. Scarrow with Steve Borman* 388

The Effect on Voters of Misleading, Confusing, and Difficult Ballot Titles *Roger Gafke and David Leuthold* 394

On the Selective Nature of Bias *Dhirendra N. Ghosh* 402

COMMENTS AND LETTERS 405

THE POLLS: Terrorism and Hijacking *Connie de Boer* 410

PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH 419

BOOK REVIEWS

Daniel Lerner and Lyle M. Nelson, eds., *Communication Research—A Half-Century Appraisal* *Herbert H. Hyman* 435

William Adams and Fay Schreibman, eds., *Television Network News: Issues in Content Research* *Garrett J. O'Keefe* 437

John A. Sonquist and William C. Dunkelberg, *Survey and Opinion Research: Procedures for Processing and Analysis* *Paul A. Scipione* 438

Donald L. Shaw and Maxwell E. McCombs, *The Emergence of American Political Issues: The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press* *Peter Clarke* 439

Robert T. Bower and Priscilla de Gasparis, *Ethics in Social Research: Protecting the Interest of Human Subjects* *Eleanor Singer* 440

Albert J. Menendez, *Religion at the Polls* *Ronald C. Green* 441

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Why Is Turnout Down?

HOWARD L. REITER

ONE of the most significant trends in American politics in the past couple of decades has been the decline in the proportion of the eligible electorate who actually vote. According to the Bureau of the Census, the turnout in presidential elections has declined each year since 1960, from 62.8 percent in 1960 to 54.4 percent in 1976 (Statistical Abstract, 1977:508). This marks the longest period of monotonic decline in turnout in American history (Congressional Record, 1970:41223-24). A nation long noted for a low rate of turnout, compared with other highly industrialized competitive polities, may soon see more than half of its eligible voters staying home on election day. Commentators have suggested a variety of causal factors—voter alienation due to Vietnam and Watergate, the eighteen-year-old vote, and registration requirements—and have predicted dire consequences for the stability and vigor of American politics. In Congress, legislation has been pending to ease registration requirements and, its sponsors hope, increase the size of the electorate.

It is our present purpose to ascertain some of the factors associated

Abstract The monotonic decline in turnout in presidential elections since 1960 is the subject of this analysis of survey data. After some common explanations for this decline were rejected, it was discovered that the decline occurred mainly among low-income and low-education whites. Two explanatory hypotheses were examined, but appropriate data for testing them were unavailable; however, in the 1970s nonvoters were more likely than voters at all income levels to express dissatisfaction with the political system. Nonvoting whites are not always a Democratic group, and their voting behavior is unpredictable over time. Their failure to vote may have an especially significant impact on Democratic party policies, and implies that palliatives like reform of voter registration laws may not have the desired effect.

Howard Reiter is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut at Storrs. Financial assistance was provided by the University of Connecticut Research Foundation, and technical assistance was provided by the staff of the Social Science Data Center and the Roper Center of the University of Connecticut. The author is indebted to his colleagues Fred Kort and Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., for their advice. Anonymous referees were also helpful.

Public Opinion Quarterly © 1979 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier North-Holland, Inc. 0033-362X/79/0043-297/$1.75

with this decline, and to speculate on possible causes and effects. We should expect no simple answers, and in this relatively brief essay we will present some initial findings that demand further analysis at greater length. Because some of the variables we will investigate are not accessible in aggregate form, we are using the surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center of the Center for Political Studies of the University of Michigan.[1] SRC/CPS turnout is well above that reported by the Census Bureau's aggregate data, but the trend over time is parallel to the aggregate data trend, and as we examine groups in the population we must assume that the degree of overreporting is comparable among all of them.

The political participation literature is filled with factors associated with high or low turnout. Some are demographic: nonvoters include disproportionate numbers of nonwhites, women, Protestants, southerners, the young and the old, rural dwellers, those of low education, income, and occupational status, and workers who do not belong to labor unions. Psychological factors come into play, too, as nonvoters are said to be disproportionately low in their sense of political efficacy, personal competence, political involvement (including media usage), and trust in government. Political factors associated with nonvoting include nonpartisanship, weak preference for one candidate over the other, and expectation of a landslide in which one's vote is especially unlikely to make a difference (Lane, 1959:46–52; Milbrath, 1965:58–62). We will examine all these factors[2] except for registration requirements, because the SRC/CPS sample does not represent all states. For reasons to be discussed below, such laws probably did not affect the decline in turnout, and the most careful study that we have of the effects of these registration laws produces conclusions not far from our own (Rosenstone and Wolfinger, 1978:22–45).

The first observation to be made is that blacks were not part of this trend, as Figure 1 demonstrates. The dramatic rise in the turnout of Southern blacks from 1960 to 1968 was clearly the result of deliberate political mobilization and the destruction of the many barriers to the franchise, but even in the North, black turnout held fairly steady. As we have reported elsewhere, the period under scrutiny was one in which blacks became much more interested in campaigns than they had been earlier (Reiter, 1975). Whites in both regions experienced roughly parallel declines, with a rise only in the turnout of southern

[1] The data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, and neither the SRC/CPS nor the ICPR bears any responsibility for the present analysis or interpretation.

[2] Limitations of space preclude discussion of our operationalization of these variables, but the author will be happy to respond to queries about it.



Figure 1. Turnout of Whites and Blacks by Region, 1960–1976

whites in 1976, perhaps due to Carter's candidacy. Because of these striking racial differences, nonwhites will be excluded from further analysis.

Some Blind Alleys

A few of the more popular hypotheses can be dismissed quite readily. Watergate could not have been a factor in most of the elections under analysis, and does not even seem to have been an important influence in 1972 (much to McGovern's dismay). Even the decline from 1972 to 1976 was not unusually steep. The eighteen-year-old vote was similarly too recent a development, and we shall demonstrate that the turnout of older voters also declined. In fact, only the decline from 1968 to 1972 can be attributed in part to this development. Strict registration requirements were not a significant factor, as they were relaxed during the period. The *Book of the States*

reveals that while 22 states had literacy tests or poll taxes in 1960, none did so by 1972; and while 32 states allowed permanent registration in all areas in 1960, 41 did so by 1972. Yet the turnout declined anyway.

The only popular hypothesis that appears to have some plausibility is the impact of the Vietnam war. Those whites who saw the war as an important problem declined in turnout more than those who did not; and of those whites for whom the war was salient, those critical of our involvement experienced a greater decline in turnout than those who thought it was not a mistake. But an explanation based primarily on Vietnam fails to account for the low turnout of 1976, by which time Vietnam was no longer an American preoccupation. Of course, Vietnam and Watergate may have had an indirect effect by lowering trust in government and political efficacy, factors we will examine below.

In several ways, the drop in turnout is truly paradoxical, because it occurred despite the increase in the American population of median education level, white-collar jobs, and real income. Moreover, whites in the SRC/CPS sample had increasing proportions of middle-class self-identifiers, Roman Catholics, and those citing many reasons for preferring one candidate and his party over the other—again, all high-turnout groups. But just as the size of these high-turnout groups increased, so did the size of some low-turnout groups in the sample—women, independents, the young and the old, those predicting a landslide, and those low on media usage, political efficacy, political involvement, personal effectiveness, and trust in government. One might hypothesize that the drop in turnout occurred merely because of the change in size of one or more of these groups.

Take age as an example. Because of the maturation of the post-World War II babies and the adoption of the Twenty-sixth Amendment, the percentage of voters under thirty years of age rose from 13.5 percent of the white sample in 1960 to 27.7 percent of the 1976 sample; and presumably because of differences in the size of age cohorts and a declining death rate, the percentage of voters seventy years of age and older rose from 9.6 percent in 1960 to 11.1 percent in 1976. Was the drop in turnout due simply to the increase in size of these low-turnout age groups? Figure 2 shows that turnout dropped noticeably among middle-aged whites, so that even controlling for the size of the age groups, the overall white turnout would have declined.[3] If both the demographic makeup and the turnout rates shifted

[3] Moreover, when the population is divided into four-year age groups, nearly every group experiences a decline in turnout by the early 1970s, compared to its counterpart



Figure 2. Turnout of Whites by Age, 1960–1976

in the direction of lower overall turnout rates, which factor was more important? In other words, was the overall drop in turnout more attributable to the increase in the proportion of young and old voters, or to the turnout declines within the age groups? Excluding voters under twenty-one, the 1976 turnout rate was 73.9 percent. Had the size of the other age groups remained at their 1960 levels, but their turnout rates dropped to their 1976 levels, the overall result in 1976 would have been a turnout of 75.7 percent. On the other hand, had each group maintained its 1960 turnout rate but expanded or contracted its size to 1976 levels, the overall turnout in 1976 would have been 80.4 percent. Since the result of controlling for size more closely approximated the actual result than did the result of controlling for turnout rate, the overall decline in turnout is probably more attributa-

in the early 1960s. As a result, only the decline in turnout from 1972 to 1976 can be attributed solely to the maturation of young adults.

ble to the turnout drop within each age group than to longitudinal changes in the age distribution.

We performed a similar analysis of partisanship, sex, expectation of closeness of outcome, media usage, political efficacy, political involvement, personal effectiveness, and trust in government. In all cases the result was the same. The decline in turnout could not be explained merely by the increase in size of a particular low-turnout group. Something else was happening.

The Highest Correlates

In any given year, a variety of independent variables are correlated with the decision whether or not to vote. These simple correlations would be sufficient to examine were it not for the fact that some are intercorrelated: people with high levels of education, for example, also tend to be middle-class self-identifiers, and people of high income tend to rank high on political efficacy. In order to determine what the most important correlates of turnout are, we need a method that will enable us to control for other variables. Such a multivariate technique will then reveal which variables became increasingly correlated with turnout from 1960 to 1976.

Our method is determined in part by the fact that our dependent variable is dichotomous—voters and nonvoters. Because of its limited assumptions about the distribution of the values of the variables, we are using discriminant analysis. This method produces standardized discriminant function coefficients which are statistically analogous to the standardized coefficients produced by multiple regression analysis. The higher the absolute value of the coefficient, the higher the correlation between the independent variable and the decision whether to vote, relative to the other independent variables (Kort, 1973; Nie et al., 1975:434–67). For all years, we coded the independent variables in such a way that the higher the value, the more likely was the individual to vote, according to the literature on nonvoting. The signs in Table 1 indicate whether the groups in parentheses had higher turnout (positive sign) or lower turnout (negative sign). For example, in Table 1, in 1960 education has a positive sign because the highly educated were more likely to vote than the less educated, even when other variables were controlled for. But note the negative sign for income in 1960; when other variables were held constant, low-income whites were *more* likely to vote than high-income whites.[4]

[4] We used the direct method in which all independent variables are entered into the analysis concurrently. This was done in order to insure that all variables would appear

Table 1. Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients for Whites, with Turnout as the Dependent Variable, 1960–1976[a]

	1960	*1964*	*1968*	*1972*	*1976*	*Slope*
Family income (High)	−.128	+.057	+.146	+.158	+.096	+.055
Education (High)	+.221	+.112	+.220	+.388	+.235	+.030
Political efficacy (High)	+.224	−.142	+.215	+.061	+.220	+.020
Personal effectiveness (High)	−.019	+.136	+.021	+.064	+.110	+.019
Partisanship (Strong)	+.186	+.249	+.206	+.296	+.242	+.016
Media usage (High)	+.063	+.216	+.223	+.174	+.143	+.012
Urban-rural locale (Urban)	+.081	−.082	−.021	−.100	+.005	+.003
Political involvement (High)	+.358	+.467	+.385	+.421	+.380	−.0002
Religion[b] (Non-Protestants)	+.034	+.038	+.039	+.173	−.055	−.004
Sex[b] (Males)	+.149	+.067	−.043	+.048	+.103	−.011
Closeness of race (Close)	+.182	−.024	+.0005	+.007	+.073	−.019
Candidate preference (Strong)	+.129	+.070	+.070	−.026	+.058	−.024
Age[b] (30 and over)	+.285	+.350	+.329	+.047	+.288	−.030
Region[b] (Non-South)	+.258	+.370	+.226	+.245	+.172	−.030
White-collar[b] (Family head)	+.345	+.287	+.144	+.157	+.169	−.048
Class identification (Middle)	+.183	+.176	−.017	−.109	+.014	−.062
Blue-collar, service[b] (No family head)	+.231	+.253	+.059	−.170	+.083	−.072
Farmer[b] (No family head)	+.388	+.220	+.095	−.113	+.077	−.096
Trust in government (High)	—	+.143	−.032	+.062	−.045	—
Canonical correlation	.458	.426	.451	.456	.446	
Wilks' Lambda	.790	.819	.797	.792	.801	
Significance of Lambda	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
% of cases correctly classified	76.3	72.6	72.4	72.1	71.3	

[a] The group associated with the positive sign for each variable appears in parentheses.
[b] Dummy variable.

in all years, and therefore a trend could be observed for each of them. In this part of our analysis, we did not separate middle-aged from elderly voters, as the most careful study known to us (Wolfinger and Rosenstone: 1977) indicates that there is no dropoff in turnout among the elderly when other variables are controlled for.

Table 1 reveals that political involvement ranked highest as a correlate of turnout in nearly all years. This is not surprising, for that variable is based on how much interest the respondent had in the campaign, and how much the respondent cared about who would win. Perhaps no other variable comes closer to the heart of the decision whether or not to vote.

However, our most pressing concern is the trend over time, and for that purpose we computed the slope of the longitudinal regression line of each variable's coefficient. The unit of time is the four-year period. For example, the coefficient for income rose about .055 every four years. (Because there was no trust-in-government variable in 1960, we computed no slope for it.) Computing regression slopes may seem to be overanalyzing the data, but we felt compelled to offer the reader some simple measure to discern trends among this plethora of numbers.

The highest overall increases were for income and education. In other words, we have been experiencing since 1960 increasing differences between white voters and nonvoters on those class dimensions. It should quickly be added, however, that class self-identification and occupation showed the largest *declines* in coefficients. So when we use the term "class" we are referring only to income and education. In this sense, the decline in turnout since 1960 has not been occurring among all social groups equally; *poor and less educated whites have been dropping out of the electorate at greater rates than wealthy and highly educated whites*. To illustrate this more directly, Table 2 shows the turnout rates of major income and educational groups among the white population. Note how little the turnout rates of the high status groups fell, and how much did the rates of the low status groups.

The skeptical reader may wonder whether this increasingly upper-class profile of the electorate might simply be the result of an increase

Table 2. Turnout of Whites by Income and Education, 1960–1976, Percent Voting

	1960	*1964*	*1968*	*1972*	*1976*
Family income					
Highest quartile	89.5%	87.7%	89.1%	89.0%	86.0%
Second highest quartile	83.4	82.0	83.3	77.5	73.5
Second lowest quartile	81.6	77.5	76.2	66.9	70.5
Lowest quartile	71.3	72.2	63.2	60.7	57.3
Education					
At least some college	91.1	88.0	84.8	87.0	85.6
High school graduate only	90.0	82.6	84.3	75.9	71.2
9–11 years	73.2	74.6	71.0	61.2	56.3
0–8 years	72.2	71.8	59.8	59.4	61.1

in the proportion of the elderly, who are less educated and earn lower incomes than younger voters, and also vote less. We performed another discriminant analysis, controlling for age by looking only at those aged thirty to sixty-nine, and again the coefficient for income rose the most. We also controlled for level of political involvement, the strongest correlate with turnout, and again low-status groups declined most in turnout. Our finding is apparently not an artifact of other trends.[5]

Possible Explanations

Why have lower-status whites been dropping out of the electorate at a faster rate than higher-status whites? One answer might be the one provided by E. E. Schattschneider, who wrote, "If the political system is dominated by the cleavage AB, what can the people who want another alignment (CD) do? One thing they may do is to stop voting" (Schattschneider, 1960:105). This is an extremely difficult question to study, for no survey familiar to the author attempts to ascertain whether the respondent is satisfied with the cleavage structure of the party system, nor is it easy to conceive of a question which would convey this in terms easily understood by most people.

A more radical proposition has been suggested by W. D. Burnham, who argues that the absence of a "viable socialist movement" has deprived working and lower-class people of a party to represent their interests and mobilize their electoral potential; hence lower turnout among these groups (Burnham, 1967:301). This would be consistent with cross-national data showing that the correlation between political participation and socioeconomic status is lower in nations with competitive socialist parties (Verba, 1972:208–10, 339–41). Again, operationalization is difficult, for the American political culture is so antisocialist that there is little evidence of yearning for socialism even among its logical constituency.

A few survey questions that only roughly approximate legitimate tests of the Schattschneider and Burnham hypotheses are at best suggestive of an answer. When asked which issues are salient to them, are nonvoters more likely than voters to cite issues that do not lie along the existing party cleavage? If so, then Schattschneider may have been right. We examined responses to open-ended questions asking what the most important problems facing the government were, and found few differences between voters and nonvoters. The only category which nonvoters almost consistently were more likely

[5] In order to test for the effects of collinearity, we ran the data without the class and occupation variables, with virtually the same results.

to cite than voters was race and public order. Only in 1964 and 1972 was the difference statistically significant at the .05 level by the chi-square test; yet those were years in which the major-party presidential candidates probably differed *more* on racial issues than during some other years. So this admittedly imperfect gauge does not confirm the hypothesis.

The most frequently cited alternative to the present party cleavage structure is one in which one party would be liberal and the other conservative. The AIPO (Gallup) survey has asked whether people would prefer such a system, but only in the off-year election of 1974 was the question asked simultaneously with an election.[6] We found that for low-income whites, advocacy of change was correlated with low turnout, but among high-income whites, the ideologues voted at a greater rate than those satisfied with the status quo. For low-income voters, then, our findings suggest possible confirmation of Schattschneider's hypothesis, but the absence of data from other years does not allow us to ascertain what impact these attitudes had on turnout over time.

A question with some possible bearing on Burnham's argument is whether a change in our form of government is desirable, which was asked in the SRC/CPS survey in 1972 and 1976. We recognize that the question is not related to the economic meaning of "socialism." Expecting that nonvoters will be more likely than voters to advocate change, we find that this was true in both years, even when income was held constant. But the absence of earlier data again handicaps our ability to analyze these attitudes longitudinally.

We leave these hypotheses neither confirmed nor refuted, because of the lack of appropriate data.

Effects on Parties and Candidates

We might expect that one of the immediate effects of an increasingly wealthy and highly educated white electorate would be an electorate that is increasingly more Republican than white nonvoters. For each year, we examined the partisan self-identification of white voters and nonvoters, and for each year through 1968, we looked at their presidential preferences. In 1972 and 1976, the SRC/CPS instrument included no question about the presidential preference of nonvoters, although we will note the results of a CBS News/*New York Times* survey in 1976. Except for George Wallace in 1968, all minor candidates have been excluded from the behavioral part of the analysis.

[6] The survey was AIPO #918-K (November 5, 1974), obtained from the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut.

The results appear in Tables 3 and 4, and they do not confirm our hypothesis.

Table 3 shows that in most years, Democrats were slightly overrepresented among voters, and in all years, independents were under-represented and Republicans substantially overrepresented. So nonvoters, as we might expect, were more independent than voters; those nonvoters with a partisan preference were considerably more likely to be Democrats than Republicans, especially when compared to voters. The latter phenomenon might be attributed to nonvoters' lower-class background. In fact, when income was controlled, differences between voters and nonvoters on the ratio of Democrats to Republicans tended to decrease, although this was not always the case in each income quartile.

Table 3. Partisan Self-Identification of Whites, by Whether One Voted, 1960–1976

	Voters	*Nonvoters*	*Difference*
1960			
Democratic	44.5%	47.4%	−2.9
Independent	21.3	25.3	−4.0
Republican	33.5	18.8	+14.7
Other	0.7	8.5	−7.8
Total	100.0	100.0	
N	(1,343)	(293)	
1964			
Democratic	50.7	48.0	+2.7
Independent	20.4	27.9	−7.5
Republican	28.7	20.1	+8.6
Other	0.2	4.0	−3.8
Total	100.0	100.0	
N	(943)	(348)	
1968			
Democratic	40.7	38.4	+2.3
Independent	29.5	36.3	−6.8
Republican	29.5	20.4	+9.1
Other	0.3	4.9	−4.6
Total	100.0	100.0	
N	(956)	(284)	
1972			
Democratic	37.0	35.2	+1.8
Independent	31.8	44.4	−12.6
Republican	30.5	16.7	+13.8
Other	0.7	3.8	−3.1
Total	100.0	100.1	
N	(1,500)	(532)	
1976			
Democratic	35.2	32.8	+2.4
Independent	34.3	45.6	−11.3
Republican	29.9	18.1	+11.8
Other	0.6	3.5	−2.9
Total	100.0	100.0	
N	(1,532)	(580)	

Table 4. Presidential Preference of Whites, by Whether One Voted, 1960–1968

	Voters	*Nonvoters*	*Difference*
1960			
Kennedy (D)	47.9%	43.3%	+4.6
Nixon (R)	52.1	56.7	−4.6
Total	100.0	100.0	
N	1,325	275	
1964			
Johnson (D)	66.1	67.6	−1.5
Goldwater (R)	33.9	32.4	+1.5
Total	100.0	100.0	
N	932	327	
1968			
Humphrey (D)	35.8	35.8	0.0
Nixon (R)	51.8	46.3	+5.5
Wallace (AI)	12.4	17.9	−5.5
Total	100.0	100.0	
N	935	257	

More pertinent to our argument are the comparisons over time, and the figures in the last column of Table 3 show no clearcut trend from 1960 to 1976. It is true that the difference between the percentage of voters who were independents and the percentage of nonvoters who were independents tended to increase over time, but this was partially offset by a narrowing of the difference in the proportion of "others" (apoliticals, adherents of minor parties, and those not responding), the other nonpartisan category. In any event, there is no obvious source of these trends in the increasingly higher socioeconomic status of the electorate.

We might expect Table 4 to reveal Democrats doing better among nonvoters than among voters, because of the partisan differences noted above. This is the assumption of many politicians and commentators as they anticipate the effects of easing voter registration laws. However, it appears from Table 4 that the most pertinent datum about nonvoters is the high proportion of independents, not Democrats, among them, for their behavior is erratic. In 1960, they were more likely than voters to favor Nixon: In 1964 the differences were negligible. In 1968, Nixon was indeed less favored among nonvoters than voters, but the beneficiary was Wallace, not Humphrey. In 1976, the CBS News/*New York Times* survey found white nonvoters substantially more likely than white voters to favor Carter, the only clearcut validation of expectation we have found.[7] In sum, Democrats should not hope for, nor Republicans fear, an automatically more

[7] The author is grateful to Warren J. Mitofsky and Kathleen A. Frankovic of CBS News for generously providing data from their survey.

Democratic electorate should turnout increase. Of course, with the addition of *nonwhite* nonvoters, the Democrats should do better. In fact, in all the years discussed here, nonvoters of all races did favor the Democrat more than did voters of all races, but only in 1964 was the difference in percent Democratic greater than 3.4 percent.

In Table 4 as in Table 3, the most important data for us are those of the last column, where there is no clear trend. Despite the increasing higher-status profile of the white electorate, there has been no increase in the difference between voters' and nonvoters' propensities to support the Democrats. Two factors may come into play here. First, nonvoters of low income, relative to voters, may be less and less class-conscious, and hence fail to perceive any reason to support the party of the have-nots. Although in all years nonvoters at all income levels were more likely than voters to identify with the working rather than the middle class, the gap between voters and nonvoters on the incidence of working-class self-identification has narrowed over the years. This means that *relative to voters* nonvoters' working-class consciousness has indeed declined. Therefore one basis for the propensity of nonvoters to support Democrats more than voters do has been undermined.

A second factor is the respondent's assessment of party differences on class issues. Are those low-income voters unable or unwilling to perceive the Democrats as the favored party? Perhaps the best question to use here is one asking which party is better for one's family's financial situation, a question which not only taps fundamental economic concerns but also avoids the problem of salience; surely everyone is concerned about the family budget. Only in 1960 and 1976 were nonvoters significantly less likely than voters to cite the Democrats as better for one's family finances, and the same is true when only respondents below the median family income are observed. In short, low-income nonvoters often lack a distinctive class identification as well as a tendency to perceive the Democrats as preferable on economic terms, so it is therefore no surprise that the Democrats do not always receive the votes of this group.

Conclusions

We have discovered that the monotonic decline in turnout from 1960 to 1976 occurred among whites and not blacks, and that some of the most commonly stated reasons do not explain the decline; that among whites, the sharpest decline occurred among those of low income and education; that appropriate tests of explanatory hypotheses by Schattschneider and Burnham may not exist, and may indeed

be almost impossible to operationalize; and that white nonvoters are not an especially Democratic lot, in part because of a lack of distinctive class consciousness and in part because of a failure to cite the Democrats as better for one's family finances.

A common assumption among political scientists is that those who participate highly are more likely to affect policy than those who do not; some empirical research has provided support for this assumption (e.g., Key, 1949:307–8, 527; Verba, 1972:302, 314, 324–26, 328–29). If this is applicable to the national level, the relative drop in the turnout of lower-status whites that we have discovered may make federal policy makers less responsive to their desires than they used to be. This may be especially significant for the Democratic party, which has claimed to speak for lower- and working-class interests. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that these groups constitute less of the Democratic coalition than they used to (Axelrod, 1978:623; Ladd, 1970: 286, 1971:46–63, 1975:226–446, and 1978:96–102). While we have found that nonvoting whites would not necessarily vote Democratic in any particular election, their withdrawal from the electorate may relieve Democratic elites of some of the *perceived* pressure from that direction. At least one of President Carter's closest political advisers seems to have inferred this (see the memorandum from Patrick Caddell, quoted in Ladd, 1978:102), and it may help to explain the President's assiduous wooing of "business confidence" and conservative economic policies. This may increase the apparent feeling of lower-status whites that there is no reason to vote.

When we compare our findings to those of Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978:22–45), who concluded that liberalizing registration laws would not significantly change the class profile of the electorate, it seems that whatever *will* bring lower-status whites back to the polls must involve a perception on their part that there is sufficient payoff in voting. Only then can we expect a significant upturn in turnout.

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Response Validity in Surveys of Voting Behavior

MICHAEL W. TRAUGOTT AND JOHN P. KATOSH

SURVEY researchers must always be concerned with the validity of the data they collect. Validity concerns have been a focus of considerable methodological interest since the advent of survey research. In the late 1940s, when response error became a major concern of the public pollsters, particular attention was devoted to the validity of survey responses concerning individual voting behavior (Dinerman, 1948; Miller, 1952; Parry and Crosley, 1950). The last major study which validated vote reports was conducted following the 1964 presidential election (Clausen, 1968), but before the implementation of the 1965 Civil Rights Act and the resulting increase in public access to these kinds of records. The research reported here is the result of the

Abstract This paper presents the results of a project which validated the reported registration and voting behavior of respondents in a national election study. The accuracy of reported voting behavior in the 1976 general election is assessed in terms of the demographic characteristics of the respondents to the Center for Political Studies National Election Study as well as the extent of their participation in a survey panel begun in 1972. Increased levels of registration and turnout are observed in association with the number of interviews in which respondents participated, and three alternative social psychological models of the effects of preelection interviews are evaluated. Although the interview apparently served as a stimulus to voting, neither a model associated with self-concept theory nor alienation theory appears to explain the phenomenon adequately. The interview effect is significant and appears to be cumulative, indicating that researchers using the survey method with panel designs should be sensitive to the effects of their method on the behavior which they are trying to measure.

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Public Opinion Quarterly © 1979 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier North-Holland, Inc. 0033-362X/79/0043-359/$1.75

first national study to replicate that effort based upon the panel study of the American electorate conducted by the Center for Political Studies from 1972 to 1976. The presentation includes a discussion of the magnitude of the misreporting of registration status and voting behavior as well as the characteristics of those who are most likely to misreport their registration or voting. It also includes an evaluation of three competing explanations of an apparent "interview effect" on voting behavior.

Estimating Registration and Voting from Surveys

Clausen's report on the results of the 1964 vote validation study stands to date as the only major investigation of the validity of voting reports in surveys. Clausen began his analysis by examining the relationship between estimates of voting derived from the Survey Research Center's (SRC) 1964 Election Study and the Census Bureau's Voting Supplement to the November 1964 Current Population Survey (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1965). He attempted to explain the overreport of turnout by respondents in two surveys by differences between the samples and the electorate as a whole. This resulted in adjustments to both the numerator and denominator of the official turnout estimate to make them more comparable to the sampled populations in both of the surveys. He then compared that "revised" official estimate of voting with the turnout estimates from each of the surveys. Finally, he reported on the results of an official records check in an attempt to ascertain the sources and consequences of the remaining differences in turnout estimates.

The data reported here are based upon equivalent surveys conducted in conjunction with the 1976 presidential election. We have attempted to replicate in our study the procedures Clausen used in 1964. The two survey sources are (1) the Center for Political Studies (CPS) 1976 National Election Study, which yielded an estimated turnout rate of 72 percent, and (2) the Census Bureau's Voting Supplement to the November 1976 Current Population Survey (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1978), which yielded an estimated turnout rate of 59 percent. Both of these turnout estimates exceed the official estimate of turnout of 54 percent, which was based upon actual election returns.

As noted above, Clausen "adjusted" both the numerator and denominator in the official estimate of turnout in order to bring them more in line with the sample population of the two surveys. Because both of the survey samples covered only the continental United States, Clausen "corrected" the numerator by deleting the vote re-

turns from Alaska and Hawaii. The essence of the adjustments to the denominator was the elimination of resident aliens, as well as the voting age population of Alaska and Hawaii, and a reduction by 1 percent of the remaining population who were physically or otherwise incapacitated and thus could not be represented in the sample population. Repeating these corrections for 1976 results in a revised numerator of 81.8 million votes cast and a revised denominator of 144.3 million eligible citizens of voting age, implying a "revised" official estimate of 1976 turnout of 56.2 percent.

When this revised figure for 1976 is compared to the Bureau of the Census estimate the difference falls within sampling error although the estimate from the Census Bureau remains the higher of the two. However, a substantial difference—16 percentage points—remains between the revised official estimate and the CPS Election Study estimate of voting turnout. One cause of this overreport might lie in the characteristics of the sample of CPS respondents. Another cause might be the fact that the 1976 Election Study included a preelection interview as well as a postelection interview (the Census Bureau study uses only a postelection interview), and some respondents who otherwise would not have voted may have been stimulated to do so because they were interviewed just prior to the election.

Validating Reported Registration and Voting in 1976

Data are presented in Table 1 for the sample distributions of sex, education, and age of the respondents as well as reports of their registration status and voting activity for the participants in the CPS 1976 Election Study and the Census Bureau's Voting Supplement to the November 1976 Current Population Survey. In addition, data are presented separately by the race of the respondent. It should be noted that the Bureau of the Census utilizes procedures to weight its survey data to conform to known marginal distributions of important demographic characteristics of the population. In the case of the Voting Supplement, the turnout estimates are then derived straightforwardly from the use of the weighted data. The Center for Political Studies data are not weighted in this fashion. Despite this methodological difference, one of the most striking features of Table 1 is the overall similarity of the sample distributions for the two national studies, which reflects the quality of both the sample design and the execution of the two surveys.

The equivalence of the distributions of respondents by their levels of education is much stronger in 1976 than it was in 1964. The CPS Election Study still slightly "overrepresents" the college-educated

Table 1. Comparison of Sample Distributions (Sex, Education, Age, and Race) and Registration and Turnout Estimates: Center for Political Studies and Census Bureau 1976 Election Studies

	Total						*Race*[a]											
							Whites						*Blacks*					
	Sample Dist.		*Est. Reg. Rates*[b]		*Est. Turnout*[b]		*Sample Dist.*		*Est. Reg. Rates*[b]		*Est. Turnout*[b]		*Sample Dist.*		*Est. Reg. Rates*[b]		*Est. Turnout*[b]	
	CPS	*Bur.*	*CPS*	*Bur.*	*CPS*	*Bur.*	*CPS*	*Bur.*	*CPS*	*Bur.*	*CPS*	*Bur.*	*CPS*	*Bur.*	*CPS*	*Bur.*	*CPS*	*Bur.*
Total	100%	100%	77%	67%	72%	59%	(88%)	(88%)	77%	68%	73%	61%	(12%)	(12%)	73%	54%	62%	45%
Sex																		
Male	42	47	79	67	77	60	43	47	79	69	77	62	33	42	78	53	78	45
Female	58	53	75	66	68	59	57	53	76	68	70	61	67	58	71	56	55	47
Education																		
Grade school	17	17	70	54	60	44	16	16	70	55	62	45	25	25	70	52	54	42
High school	51	53	72	64	66	56	51	53	73	65	68	58	50	50	68	53	56	44
College	32	30	87	79	86	74	33	31	87	81	86	75	25	25	87	62	84	56
NA	*	—	70	—	47	—	*	—	79	—	47	—	*	—	0	—	0	—
Age																		
18–20	5	8	46	47	43	38	5	8	46	50	46	41	8	8	40	33	21	23
21–24	9	10	71	55	62	46	9	10	70	57	63	48	8	8	79	40	60	30
25–44	39	37	75	66	71	59	39	36	75	67	72	60	42	42	74	55	64	41
45–64	28	30	87	76	80	69	28	30	88	77	81	70	25	25	79	64	70	59
65 or more	18	15	76	71	72	62	18	16	77	72	73	63	16	16	68	61	57	52
NA	1	—	64	—	73	—	1	—	67	—	70	—	*	—	50	—	100	—
CPS (*N*)	(2,882)		(2,865)[d]		(2,415)[e]		(2,504)		(2,492)[d]		(2,121)[e]		(354)		(349)[b]		(272)[c]	

[a] Excludes those for whom race was not ascertained.

[b] The figures in these columns are the percent of sample respondents who claimed to be registered or to have voted.

[c] The sample *N*'s for the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey are not published. Rather, the data are weighted to estimate the entire U.S. eligible voting population.

[d] Excludes those for whom registration status was not ascertained.

[e] Includes only those with a post-election interview.

* Less than .5%

but not, as occurred in 1964, at the expense of "underrepresenting" the grade-school-educated population. However, it should be noted that with respect to age, the CPS Election Study still "underrepresents" the youngest voting age group. To the extent that these younger groups are consistently characterized by the lowest levels of registration and voting (as evidenced by both studies), one might expect the overall registration and voting figures derived from the CPS Election Study to be slightly inflated.

On the other hand, the CPS Election Study also "underrepresents" males and by a margin twice as large as in 1964, a sampling difference whose impact is not clear. According to the Bureau estimates of registration and voting, it should not make much difference whether there are relatively fewer (or more) men than women in the survey since their participation rates were virtually identical in 1976. However, according to the CPS Election Study estimates, it would make a difference because men seem to participate at higher rates than women. Using these CPS Election Study estimates, then, one might expect the overall registration and voting figures to be slightly deflated because of the underrepresentation of men in the sample.

Regardless of the nature of any sampling fluctuations between the two samples, the most important feature of Table 1 is the clear and consistent manner by which the registration and voting estimates from the CPS Election Study exceed those from the Census Bureau's study. In every category but two (overall registration among eighteen- to twenty-year-olds, and voting turnout among eighteen- to twenty-year-old blacks) the rates derived from the CPS Election Study are higher than those from the Census Bureau. Overall, the CPS estimated registration rate exceeds the Bureau's rate by 10 percentage points, and the CPS estimated voting rate is 13 percentage points higher than the Census rate. When controlling for race, the differences in the two studies' figures increase dramatically for nonwhites—19 percentage points for registration and 17 for turnout—and decrease only slightly for whites—to about 9 and 12 percentage points for registration and voting, respectively. In his study of the 1964 election, Clausen found differences in estimated turnout between the two data sources to be 11 percentage points for whites and 14 percentage points for blacks. He did not present any similar data for estimated registration rates.

Are these large differences in the estimated participation rates between these two national studies adequately explained by differences in the samples? Clausen suggested part of the difference in 1964 was probably a result of the Census Bureau's more complete coverage of the eligible voting population, in terms of both the interview comple-

tion rate and the nature of the sample. In 1976 these explanations were still valid. The response rate for the Census Bureau's 1976 election survey of households, which accepted reports of behavior from related individuals, was approximately 96 percent, whereas the response rate for the 1976 CPS Election Study of individuals was about 65 percent. Analysis of postelection mortality among preelection respondents in the CPS Election Studies generally indicates that refusals to participate in an election study survey are more likely to occur among citizens with low levels of interest in politics and hence low political participation rates. We infer that the characteristics of those who initially refuse to be interviewed are similar, so that higher aggregate voting rates result for the survey as a whole. Therefore, the assumption is that although the response rate to the CPS survey is lower, the registration and voting estimates derived from those who were interviewed are higher. These effects are discussed in greater detail below.

We have attempted to account for the discrepancy between the CPS Election Study and Census Bureau's estimates of registration and voter turnout, but both those estimates are somewhat higher than the revised "official" estimate of voter turnout on election day in 1976. The most plausible explanation for these differences is response error—respondents have "misreported" (deliberately or otherwise) their registration status or voting behavior. In order to ascertain the magnitude of registration and vote misreporting, the Center for Political Studies in mid-1977, as part of a larger study on election administration, attempted to examine the official registration and voting records for each respondent who had participated in a postelection interview as a part of the 1972, 1974, or 1976 National Election Studies. The data from the Vote Validation Study which were utilized in the research reported here are from the registration and voting records for the postelection respondents in the national cross-section sample of the CPS 1976 Election Study.

The results from the Vote Validation Study indicate that only 69 percent of the respondents were found to be actually registered, compared to 77 percent of the respondents who said in their interview they were registered to vote. And while 72 percent of the respondents claimed to have voted in the 1976 presidential election, the check of the administrative records yielded a turnout figure of only 61 percent. Both of these "validated" figures are much closer to the revised official estimates than were the respondents' self-report figures. This is a clear indication that a fairly large amount of "misreporting" occurred among respondents to the 1976 CPS National Election Study.

The data in Table 2 compare the registration and voting information for the 1976 Election Study respondents obtained from the Vote Validation Study with the respondents' self-report of their registration and voting participation. For the most part, the Vote Validation respondent classifications are self-explanatory. Categories 2 and 6, however, require some clarification. Category 2 identifies a group of respondents for whom there were registration records but no available voting records for the 1976 general election. Category 6 identifies two respondents who were apparently interviewed by mistake; that is, they resided in counties that were not a part of the election study sample frame, and thus no check of their records was attempted.

We define "misreporters" as those respondents whose self-report on the survey of registration status or voting behavior was not verified when the official records check was made. That is, they are people who reported that they were registered or that they voted, but no official record of that behavior was found. Conversely, some people reported that they were not registered or did not vote, but according to the official records, they actually were registered or had voted. Those survey respondents whose names or registration status

Table 2. Vote Validation Respondent Classification by Election Study Self-Reports of Registration and Voting

	Election Study Self-Report					
	Registered			*Voted*		
Vote Validation Respondent Classification[a]	*Yes*	*No*	*Don't Know*	*Yes*	*No*	*(N)*
1. Registration recorded Vote recorded	1358	[55]	4	1390	[27]	1417
2. Registration recorded No voting information	28	[1]	—	23	6	29
3. Registration recorded No record of voting	157	[18]	1	[70]	106	176
4. No record of registration No record of voting	[288]	439	9	[217]	519	736
5. Name of respondent not obtained	35	20	—	31	24	55
6. Out of P.S.U.: no record check attempted	1	1	—	1	1	2
	1867	534	14	1732	683	2415

NOTE: The boxed figures represent those individuals who are considered to be "misreporters."

[a] The Vote Validation Respondent Classification categories above compare to the categories in Clausen's Table 2 "Respondent Classification" as follows:

Vote Validation	1	2	3	4	5	6
Clausen	3	4	8	9	5	7

The remainder of Clausen's categories (1, 2, 6, 10) are inappropriate for the 1976 Vote Validation study because they deal with absentee voting behavior and poll tax requirements.

were not obtained in the survey are excluded from classification, as are those respondents whose voting records could not be checked. Summing those cell entries where it is possible to identify whether a correct or an incorrect report was made results in classifying a total of 15 percent of the study respondents as registration misreporters and 14 percent of the respondents as voting misreporters.

The data in Table 3 characterize these misreporters according to a brief list of selected variables. Neither sex nor education is very strongly related to whether or not a respondent is a misreporter. Age, race, and income are related, however, with the younger, nonwhite, and low income groups more likely to misreport their registration and voting. There are some differences between misreporters on two of the attitudinal indices—the measures of political efficacy and citizen duty—but with the exception of the registration misreporters' relatively low citizen duty scores, the differences are not very great. Democrats misreport their registration and voting more often than Republicans, but the differences by levels of partisanship are insignificant. There are some clear differences, however, in misreporting based upon how many previous election studies a respondent has participated in. That is, those who were participating in an election study survey for the first time in 1976 were about twice as likely to misreport their registration or voting status as those who were interviewed for the third election study.

In addition to our general concern with overreporting of voting, we were also specifically interested in what effect the misreporting might have on our sample survey report of the partisan division of the vote in the 1976 presidential election. Of those election study respondents who reported voting for either Jimmy Carter or Gerald Ford in 1976, 51.5 percent reported having cast their ballots for Carter. However, when we consider only those respondents whose reports of having voted could be verified, the number who said they supported Carter slips to 48.8 percent, giving Ford 51.2 percent. Although the differences reflected in both of these results are well within sampling error, they do illustrate a distinct partisan difference in the candidate preferences of the misreporters. For those people whose voting report could not be verified, a claim of support for Carter over Ford ran almost two to one. These figures may provide some evidence of a small postelection "bandwagon" effect in favor of Carter, or they may be an indication of how these respondents would have cast their votes if they had gone to the polls.

Clausen would not be surprised by the small amount of overreport of the Carter vote in the 1976 CPS Election Study. At the conclusion of his 1964 article he presented data which showed that the survey

Table 3. Selected Characteristics of Respondents Who Misreported Their Registration or Voting, 1976

	Percent Misreporting Registration	*Percent Misreporting Voting*
Total Sample[a]	15%	14%
Sex		
Male	17	15
Female	15	12
Education		
Grade school	14	15
High school	16	12
College	15	14
Age		
18–24	22	18
45 or older	12	12
Race		
Nonwhite	24	20
White	14	12
Income		
Less than $6,000	22	19
$20,000 or more	12	10
Political efficacy		
Very low	17	15
Very high	13	12
Political trust		
Very low	16	13
Very high	16	12
Citizen duty		
Very low	22	15
Very high	15	14
Party identification		
Democrat	16	16
Independent	16	13
Republican	13	11
Partisan strength		
Strong	16	14
Weak	15	14
Independent & Independent-leaner	13	16
Number of election studies interviewed		
1 (1976)	19	16
2 (1974 and 1976)	13	15
3 (1972, 1974, and 1976)	10	9

[a] Excluding those respondents whose names were not obtained or who resided out of the P.S.U. (categories 5 and 6 in Table 2) and, for voting only, respondents who resided in places where the voting records could not be checked (category 2 in Table 2).

overreport of the winner's proportion of the two-party vote appeared to be a function of the candidate being advantaged by the short-term forces of the campaign. That is, the greater the margin by which the candidate was able to exceed his party's expected "normal vote," the greater was the overreport of candidate preference in his favor (Con-

verse, 1966), allowing for the initial partisan majority enjoyed by the Democrats.

In 1976, the expected normal vote was 53.4 percent Democratic (Miller et al., 1979). As the Democratic candidate, Carter received only 51.1 percent of the two-party vote. In effect, Carter lost the campaign while winning the election. Moreover, Ford could not mobilize enough of the support provided by his incumbency to win the election. Carter's net "loss" of 2.3 percentage points from his expected normal vote suggests that not many of the "low interest" citizenry who might have been stimulated by either the events of the campaign or the preelection interview voted Democratic.

This is demonstrated in Table 4 which compares the deviation from the normal vote for the political party that won the presidential election in a given year and the amount of the overreport of the vote for that party in the CPS postelection study for the same year. The data from 1952 to 1964 come from Clausen, and the data for 1968 to 1976 have been added. The trend exhibited in the data for the earlier years is clearly continued in 1976. The low level of overreport of voting for Carter is associated with his negative deviation from the normal Democrat vote.

Competing Explanations for "Interview Effects" on Voting

In addition to identifying the sources of likely error in the overestimates of voting derived from the Survey Research Center's 1964 Election Study and the Bureau of the Census November Voter Supplement conducted in the same year, Clausen also observed that the validated participation rate in the SRC study remained greater than the turnout figure for the nation as a whole or in the "corrected" Census Survey. Considering that each SRC Election Study respon-

Table 4. Deviation from "Normal" Vote and Overestimate of the Winner's Percentage in Presidential Elections, SRC/CPS Data, 1952–1976

Election	*Winner*	*Net Deviation Toward Party of Winners*	*Overestimate of Winner's Margin*[a]
1952	Republican	13.55	2.7
1956	Republican	13.18	1.9
1960	Democrat	−5.14	−0.7
1964	Democrat	6.84	6.0
1968[b]	Republican	6.1	2.8
1972	Republican	15.3	2.5
1976	Democrat	−2.3	0.4

[a] Computed using only Humphrey and Nixon votes.
[b] Based upon postelection surveys.

dent was interviewed before the election as well as after, Clausen developed a "stimulus hypothesis" to explain this phenomenon: "An additional anomaly is introduced into the sample turnout estimate by the fact that an interview was conducted before as well as after the election. This raised the possibility that the preelection interview may have stimulated interest *and participation* in the election among the survey respondents" (Clausen, 1968).

The role of personal contact by interviewers as well as by political parties and their loyal supporters in increasing levels of voter turnout is well documented (Gosnell, 1927; Eldersveld, 1956; Kramer, 1970; Crotty, 1971). And despite the fact that higher levels of voter participation among survey panel respondents interviewed before an election are commonly observed, only recently have alternatives to the stimulus hypothesis been formulated. Researchers utilizing alienation theory and self-concept theory have suggested two additional explanations for the apparent interview effect. Kraut and McConahay (1973) advocate an "alienation reduction hypothesis," which suggests that the personal contact of the interview alters the individual's perception of the political environment, diminishing or eliminating the psychological barrier that many citizens see as cutting them off from political participation. Unfortunately, they do not present any data from their 1970 New Haven study which include measures of political alienation. Although their hypothesis seems plausible, they do not demonstrate that the interview experience results in changes in these basic attitudes and hence in voting behavior.

Kraut and McConahay also posit a "self-concept hypothesis," which suggests that, after being interviewed or interacting with a campaign worker, an individual begins to view himself as more politically inclined—"having engaged in political activity, he begins to think of himself as politically active, somewhat involved in politics, and this increases the likelihood that he votes" (pp. 404–405). Kraut and McConahay present no data directly testing this hypothesis, but a test of this hypothesis was presented by Yalch (1976) in a study of voters in a Chicago ward during special elections in 1973. He found that preelection interviews have a stimulus effect but that the effect of the experimental treatment decays rapidly. Yalch concludes that his research confirms the "stimulus hypothesis" and disconfirms both the "alienation reduction" and "self-concept" hypotheses. Unfortunately, no measures of basic personal or political attitudes relating to political alienation or enhanced self-concept were presented as part of Yalch's findings.

The data from the 1976 Vote Validation Study are particularly well suited to testing these three competing hypotheses in a rather direct

fashion. The CPS 1976 Election Study represents the third and final data collection point in a panel study dating back to 1972. This overcomes the Kraut-McConahay methodological criticism of Clausen's comparison of two similar but independent samples of the SRC and Bureau of the Census surveys in 1964. We have validated voting behavior in the 1976 general election for respondents who were interviewed two, three, or five times in the 1972–1976 period, including the pre- and postelection interviews of 1972, the postelection interview of 1974, and the pre- and postelection interviews of 1976. Leaving aside the 1976 postelection interview, which is critical to the validation element of the study but not to testing the stimulus hypothesis, we can look at the effect of being interviewed one, two, or four times on the respondents' likelihood of voting in the 1976 general election.

Furthermore, the typical lengthy CPS interview contains extensive questions relating to respondents' attitudes towards the candidates, parties, and issues. In particular, two basic measures of political attitudes are available to test directly the alienation reduction and self-concept hypotheses. A series of five items commonly used to construct a Political Trust Scale were administered in each of the three election studies (Robinson et al., 1968). This scale measures the respondent's alienation from the political system. In addition, a series of four items commonly used to construct a Political Efficacy Scale were also included in the survey (Campbell et al., 1954). An individual's sense of political efficacy—the degree to which he feels he can have an impact on government—is a measure which relates directly to self-concept theory. The availability of these repeated measures for a variety of meaningfully different subsets of respondents who were interviewed different numbers of times provides us with the opportunity to examine the trends in feelings of alienation and enhanced self-concept over time and their relation to voting behavior. Specifically, the panel design permits us to test for the changes in political efficacy and political trust suggested by the alienation reduction and self-concept hypotheses, as well as to test for changes in the basic, and well-documented, relationships between these measures and voting behavior.

Results and Discussion

The significance of the effect of being interviewed on levels of voter participation is established unequivocally by the data presented in Table 5. The validated voting rate for the postelection respondents in the 1976 CPS National Election Study was 61 percent, or approx-

Table 5. Validated Voting Rates in the 1976 General Election for Selected Groups of Respondents in the CPS 1976 Election Study

	Validated Voting Rate	*N*
Complete 1976 cross-section sample	61%	2,328
Preelection interview date		
September interviewees	60	892
October–November interviewees	62	1,436
Panel status of respondents in 1976		
Supplementary cross-section	54	1,425
Previously interviewed	72	903
Respondents' panel participation		
1976 election study only	54	1,440
1974 and 1976 election studies only	61	176
1972, 1974, and 1976 election studies	75	712

imately 7 percentage points higher than the national estimate based upon aggregate election returns (54 percent), or 5 percentage points larger than the adjusted figure (56 percent) calculated earlier, which is based upon revision of the estimates of the size of the denominator in the calculation from the surveys. There was no significant difference between the turnout rates for respondents interviewed during the month immediately preceding the election (October) and those interviewed two months (September) before the election, indicating that the immediate effect of the stimulus of the interview did not vary by proximity to the actual election.

However, it is clear that the turnout rate in 1976 was substantially higher for respondents who had been interviewed prior to the 1976 Election Study compared to those interviewed for the first time in 1976. Thus, the interview effect is clearly cumulative, as an elaboration of the data shows the highest participation rate among those who were interviewed the most number of times. The observed difference of 8 percentage points between those interviewed for the first time in 1976 (54 percent) and those interviewed once prior to 1976 (61 percent) substantially increases to 21 percentage points (75 percent) for those interviewed in both prior election studies.

Before proceeding further in the presentation of findings, there are two questions of some significance raised by the data in Table 5. The first concerns the degree to which the differences associated with panel participation are the consequence of mortality among respondents rather than an effect of the interview. The answer to this question is that a mortality effect can be observed in the panel data, but it is not nearly so large as the interview effect appears to be. Respondents who refused successive interviews tend to be less involved and interested in politics than their cohorts who persisted in the panel study. And their reported voting rates (unvalidated) at the

time when both groups were in the sample were about 6 percentage points lower (66 percent as opposed to 73 percent in 1972, for example). However, an extension of this analysis indicates that the interview effect is much more substantial than the consequences of mortality.

The second question concerns the relatively low rate of participation among the new respondents interviewed for the first time in 1976, less than the revised official turnout estimate calculated above (56 percent). Analysis of the demographic characteristics of the respondents in the supplementary sample shows that they are much younger and disproportionately nonwhite compared to the population as a whole. As a result, this would lead us to expect that participation rates would have been even lower among these respondents if it were not for the fact that they were interviewed before the election.

The differences in participation rates in Table 5 due to the interview are within the range of magnitude of those observed by Yalch and by Kraut-McConahay. They confirm the existence of an interview effect and demonstrate that it is cumulative, lending support to the stimulus hypothesis. The present design does not allow us to ascertain whether the effect persists or for how long, since there are no plans to check the voting records of these respondents after the 1978 election.

It is possible, however, to move to a more direct test of the competing alienation and self-concept hypotheses. Irrespective of the persistence of the interview effect, these two theories predict certain shifts in the basic distribution of attitudes which measure political alienation or enhanced self-concept as a function of having been interviewed in conjunction with the election studies. Beginning with the Index of Political Efficacy, a basic measure of an individual's sense of power in affecting the political system, the self-concept hypothesis would suggest that a shift toward the higher end in the distribution of scores on the index results from an increased perception of political influence and involvement that stems from the interview. The data in Table 6 show that this did not occur.

The initial set of distributions presented in Table 6 show that there was no significant difference in the distributions of scores on the efficacy scale for the various cross-section samples of respondents interviewed from 1972 to 1976. This is important to establish as a benchmark for subsequent comparisons indicating that there was no overall shift in these attitudes in the population as a whole. In the 1974 data, for example, the distribution of attitudes for respondents who had been interviewed in 1972 as well are compared with those for respondents who were interviewed for the first time in 1974. There are no significant differences between the distributions for "old" and

Table 6. The Distribution of Scores on the Sense of Political Efficacy Scale for Respondents in the CPS Election Studies, 1972–1976

	Political efficacy					
	Low				*High*	*N*
1972 cross-section	24%	23	22	20	11	(2,682)
1974 cross-section	22%	27	22	20	9	(2,469)
1976 cross-section	24%	23	20	22	11	(2,363)
1974 interviewees						
Panel respondents[a]	22%	23	22	22	12	(1,606)
New respondents	20%	29	22	20	9	(1,380)
1976 interviewees						
Panel respondents[b]	20%	21	22	24	12	(2,029)
New respondents	25%	24	20	22	9	(1,437)
Full panel respondents[c]						
1972 interview	20%	21	23	23	14	(1,312)
1974 interview	20%	22	22	23	13	(1,285)
1976 interview	20%	22	20	24	13	(1,204)

[a] These are respondents who were interviewed in both the 1972 and 1974 studies, although not every respondent was a member of the 1974 cross-section sample.

[b] These are respondents who were interviewed in 1976 and either or both of the 1974 and 1972 studies, although not every respondent was a member of the 1976 cross-section sample.

[c] These are the respondents who were interviewed in all three studies with data presented separately for each point in time.

"new" respondents in 1974, nor between either of these groups and the complete national cross-section of respondents in 1972. The same conclusion can be drawn by comparing "new" and "old" respondents in 1976 and the distributions of their efficacy scores with those for 1974 and 1972. Although it may appear that there is a difference between the new and panel respondents in 1976, this difference is more appropriately attributed to the characteristics of the new respondents than it is to a change in the distribution of efficacy scores for respondents who were full participants in the panel. The data for the panel respondents are displayed separately for each time they were interviewed in 1972, 1974, and 1976. These distributions are neither shifting over time nor different from any of the other groups of respondents for whom data are presented in the table.

It is just as important, of course, to take advantage of the longitudinal element of the panel design to see if individual attitudes changed over time. The range of intercorrelations for each of three pairs of comparisons of respondents interviewed at two or more points in time was between .57 and .61, as measured by gamma. These data indicate that there were no substantial changes in self-concept as a result of being interviewed, as measured by sense of political efficacy. Additionally, there was no change in the positive relationship between levels of political efficacy and self-reported voting.

The second competing hypothesis suggests that the interview acts as a mediating factor by reducing the respondents' sense of alienation from the political system, which thus results in increased voting participation. The most common measure of alienation employed by political scientists is the Trust in Government Scale. It is composed of five items which reflect beliefs in the fairness of the political system and the honesty and competence of those who serve in it. The observed relationship between trust in government and voting is much weaker than the observed relationship between efficacy and voting. But again, as a minimum condition, the alienation reduction hypothesis would lead us to expect that the frequency of being interviewed should be associated with increased levels of trust in government. This should in turn be associated with higher levels of turnout.

Data are presented in Table 7 for the distribution of scores on the Trust in Government Scale for various sample components of the 1972, 1974, and 1976 National Election Studies. The data for the three cross-sections presented initially illustrate the apparent "bottoming out" of a recent national trend in declining levels of trust attributable to Watergate. In both 1974 and 1976, the distribution of scores for the two groups of panel respondents and those who were added as a supplement to reproduce a national cross-section are very similar to each other. The distributions of scores for full panel respondents

Table 7. The Distribution of Scores on the Trust in Government Scale for Respondents in the CPS Election Studies, 1972–1976

	Trust in Government					
	Low				*High*	*N*
1972 cross-section	14%	20	36	17	13	(2,246)
1974 cross-section	21%	27	35	11	6	(2,489)
1976 cross-section	22%	29	35	10	5	(2,822)
1976 interviewees						
Panel respondents[a]	21%	27	34	12	6	(1,604)
New respondents	21%	26	36	10	6	(1,401)
1976 interviewees						
Panel respondents[b]	22%	28	34	11	5	(2,226)
New respondents	21%	28	36	9	5	(1,816)
Full panel respondents[c]						
1972 interview	15%	20	36	17	13	(1,303)
1974 interview	20%	26	35	12	6	(1,284)
1976 interview	20%	29	34	11	6	(1,290)

[a] These are respondents who were interviewed in both the 1972 and 1974 studies, although not every respondent was a member of the 1974 cross-section sample.

[b] These are respondents who were interviewed in 1976 and either or both of the 1974 and 1972 studies, although not every respondent was a member of the 1976 cross-section sample.

[c] These are the respondents who were interviewed in all three studies with data presented separately for each point in time.

demonstrate that levels of trust among this group declined from 1972 to 1974 in accord with the national trend, but contrary to what would have been expected according to the alienation reduction hypothesis. From 1974 to 1976, the distribution stabilized, again contrary to the alienation reduction hypothesis. Thus, there is no effect of being interviewed which can be associated with reduced levels of alienation.

Turning to the relationship between levels of trust in government for the same respondents measured at different points in time, the correlations (gammas) between these attitudes are in about the same range as those for political efficacy (.47 to .59). Trust in government is not generally a very good predictor of voting behavior, and there is no variation from this basic relationship in the 1972, 1974, or 1976 data for any subgroup of respondents. The alienation reduction hypothesis might have led us to expect that even though there is no commonly found relationship between trust and voting, an increased level of trust might be associated with an increased likelihood of voting. This expected variation on the basic hypothesis is not supported by the data.

The results of the analysis presented above confirm that there is an interview effect on the voting behavior of survey respondents. Moreover, this effect is clearly cumulative, increasing with the number of times an individual is interviewed. However, it cannot be determined from the available data whether the effect is long- or short-lived. There is some basis for inferring that repeated interviews may result in a long-term effect, to the extent that voting can be seen as a habitual form of behavior whose likelihood increases as a function of the number of past elections in which a person has participated. If repeated interviews result in successively greater instances of voting, then the "habit" may eventually be acquired.

As for the testing of the three alternative explanations of the interview effect, the stimulus hypothesis was confirmed, whereas the alienation reduction and self-concept hypotheses were disconfirmed. There were no significant shifts in individual attitudes related to trust in government or sense of political efficacy among the panel respondents which could be attributed to being interviewed. Nor was there a shift in the commonly observed relationships between either of these measures and reported voting behavior.

Summary

This paper has presented findings from a study of the validation of respondents' self-reported political behavior through a check of relevant administrative records. This check of reported registration and

voting revealed large amounts of overreport which could be explained by attitudinal measures that identified less politically active respondents as those most likely to err in their reports. There was also a predictable consequence of the misreporting in the partisan division of reported candidate preference. The results of the validation effort further indicated a substantial effect of the interview itself on the central behavior which it was intended to measure, indicating that some respondents were stimulated to vote by the very act of being interviewed.

While studies of voting behavior are frequently conducted and often the most heavily publicized examples of sample surveys, they do not, of course, represent the only research setting in which the consequences of an interview effect may be important. The results presented above should be of concern to social scientists and market researchers who utilize survey methods with panel designs because they demonstrate that these techniques can have a direct consequence on the behavior of respondents. The data collection method represents a potential source of contamination to the very relationships which it is being used to measure.

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The Polls: Terrorism and Hijacking

CONNIE DE BOER

THE public is deeply concerned over the increase in the frequency of acts of violence involving the holding of hostages and other terrorism. Late in 1977, 90 percent of the population of the United States considered terrorism a very serious problem, and according to an opinion survey conducted half a year later in Great Britain, 85 percent of the British population hold the same view. Regarding terrorism in their own country, and this applies specifically to Great Britain, fewer people consider terrorism to be a very serious problem (Harris, SOC).

The farther from home the acts of violence take place, the less sure people are whether the perpetrators are to be seen as terrorists or freedom fighters. In Great Britain, the IRA are regarded as terrorists by 92 percent; the PLO by 70 percent, and the people opposing Mr. Smith in Rhodesia by 34 percent. The "Don't know" percentage rises from 6 percent for the IRA to 21 percent for the PLO, and to 29 percent for the people opposing Mr. Smith (SOC, Dec. 1977).

Harris and Social Surveys put before the public a list of statements on causes of terrorism asking respondents to indicate whether they felt each statement referred to a major, a minor, or hardly a cause of terrorism. A marked feature of the results is that the "Not sure/Don't know" percentages are much higher in Great Britain than they are in the United States. Furthermore, almost every statement is seen as a major cause of terrorism by a fairly high percentage of the population.

The list of statements on possible solutions of terrorism also finds wide approval among the public. Either Harris and SOC have not included extreme views in the list of statements, or people are prepared to endorse any possible solution to terrorism, even if they would not normally approve of the method employed. The latter explanation is supported by the results of other opinion surveys: Introduction of the death penalty for terrorists is favored by a majority of 55 percent in Germany (DMS, 1976), 55 percent in the United States (Harris, 1977), and 71 percent in Great Britain (SOC, 1978). In the Netherlands, 62 percent are in favor of placing South Moluccans under strict surveillance, even if the country should

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Published by Elsevier North-Holland, Inc. 0033-362X/79/0043-410/$1.75

somewhat resemble a police state in that case: 73 percent of the Dutch want especially vigorous action taken against terrorists, and 44 percent feel the terrorists are not entitled to the same rights as other arrested suspects.

In Germany, several opinion surveys indicate the willingness of people to sacrifice their personal rights and liberties and to accept a strengthened influence of the state and the police if this can serve the purpose of combating terrorism (DMS). An ample majority of the German people (77 percent) are in agreement with the news embargo that was instituted by the government a few days after Schleyer was kidnapped by the RAF. They approve because the publicity aimed for by the terrorists is thus withheld from them, and also because it enables the politicians to decide freely without continuously having to justify their decisions (DMS, 1977).

The opinion survey conducted early 1978 in Germany (DMS, Jan. 1978) also reveals that the battle against terrorists can have serious consequences for civil liberties: 21 percent, or 1 out of 5 Germans, feel that "one nowadays has to be careful with what one says in the Federal Republic; one always has to be afraid of being misunderstood and of being at once suspected of sympathizing with the terrorists." And a sympathizer, according to 18 percent of the German population, is a person who does not wish the death penalty introduced for the terrorists, or, according to 56 percent, a person who feels compassion for the terrorists because he believes them to commit their crimes out of despair only.

The following research institutes have given us permission to publish the results of their surveys, for which we here express our sincere thanks and indebtedness.

AIPO—American Institute for Public Opinion, USA
DMS—Institut für Demoskopie, West Germany
EMNID—Emnid Institut GmbH & Co., West Germany
Harris—The Harris Survey, USA
NIPO—Nederlands Instituut voor de Publieke Opinie, Netherlands
REOP—Instituto de la Opinion Publica, Spain
SOC—Social Surveys Ltd., Great Britain
Texas Poll—The Texas Poll, USA

The dates given with the tables are the publication dates of the research results. Where a date is marked with an asterisk, several breakdowns are given in the corresponding publication which have not been included in the present article. The surveys are based on nation- or statewide representative samples of adults. For more information or additional breakdowns, contact The Polls Archives, Weteringschans 100–102, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

Terrorism—A Serious Problem

USA—Harris (Dec. 1977/Great Britain—SOC (June 1978): *How serious a problem do you feel terrorism is in the world, where terrorists kidnap businessmen, hijack planes and commit other violence–very serious, only somewhat serious, or hardly serious at all?*

	USA	*Great Britain*
Very serious	90%	85%
Only somewhat serious	9	12
Hardly serious at all	1	2
Not sure/Don't know	—	1

How serious do you feel terrorism is here in (own country)—very serious, only somewhat serious, or hardly serious at all?

	USA	*Great Britain*
Very serious	60%	30%
Only somewhat serious	31	40
Hardly serious at all	7	27
Not sure/Don't know	2	3

West Germany—EMNID: *What do you consider the most important public event of the year 1977?* [Open answers, Jan. 1978*]

	Total
Terrorism, kidnappings, suicides of terrorists	59%
Peace efforts, Israel-Egypt	15
Peace efforts generally	3
Birth/death of famous personalities	1
Other answers	5
No answer	17

Terrorist—Criminals or Freedom Fighters?

Great Britain—SOC: *People who are called terrorists by some people may be seen as freedom fighters by others. What is your view of people who commit acts of violence against civilian populations?* (Dec. 1977)

	Terrorists	*Freedom Fighters*	*Don't Know*
First, would you say the IRA are terrorists or freedom fighters?	92%	3%	6%
And what about the PLO, the Palestine Liberation Organization?	70	9	21
And the people opposing Mr. Smith in Rhodesia?	34	37	29

People who are called terrorists by some people may be seen as freedom fighters by others. What is your view of these people who commit acts of violence against civilian populations? Are they always justified in what they do, sometimes justified, or never justified? (Jan. 1978)

Always justified	2%
Sometimes justified	16
Never justified	77
Don't know	5

Spain—REOP: *Would you say that hijacking should always be regarded as a common crime, or that its criminal character can be predominated by political implications?* (Oct/Dec 1972*)

Should always be considered a common crime	32%
Political implications can predominate	60
No answer	8

Causes of Terrorism

USA–Harris (Dec. 1977)/Great Britain–SOC (June 1978):

	Major	*Minor*	*Hardly*	*Not Sure/ Don't Know*
Acts of terrorism receive so much coverage in the news that this encourages terrorists to further acts of terror.				
USA	78%	12%	3%	7%
Great Britain	60	20	10	10
Terrorism is growing in the world because the countries of the world have been too soft in dealing with terrorists.				
USA	76	12	4	8
Great Britain	75	10	7	8
Terrorism has always been the weapon used by radicals who feel the system is totally unjust.				
USA	70	15	5	10
Great Britain	44	22	10	24
As in Germany, young radicals feel their cause can only achieve attention by committing acts of violence.				
USA	68	16	5	11
Great Britain	48	20	11	21
Racial and religious minorities feel their cause can only be brought to attention through terror acts.				
USA	54	22	12	12
Great Britain	42	25	16	17
A modern, complex industrial society makes it easy for a small number of terrorists to commit major acts of violence.				
USA	49	25	12	14
Great Britain	34	22	15	29
Professional terrorists are trained by Palestinian Arabs in Lebanon.				
USA	40	18	11	31
Great Britain	39	15	12	34
Professional terrorists are trained by President Khadafy of Lybia.				
USA	27	18	11	44
Great Britain	18	14	15	53

Spain—REOP: *You may have heard that a number of acts of terrorism have been perpetrated all over the world. What do you believe to be the cause of these actions?* (Oct./Dec. 1972*)

Eagerness to receive attention on the part of those who commit them	18%
It is a way to defend their rights	17
It is a form of crime which is typical of our time	39
It is the only way of fighting that is open to them	14
Others	4
No answer	7

Solution and Prevention of Terrorism

USA—Texas Poll: *What do you personally feel should be done to prevent the hijacking of airplanes?* (Nov. 1970)

Put guards on planes	40%
Search all passengers	25
Use detection devices	14
Check all baggage	5
Screen passengers	5
Seal off pilots	2
Provide severe penalties	14
Extradite hijackers	4
Other replies	10
Undecided	21
	(multiple answers)

USA—Harris (Dec. 1977)/Great Britain—SOC (June 1978): *Now let me ask you about some solutions that have been proposed as ways of dealing with terrorism. For each, tell me if you favor or oppose that solution.*

	Favor	*Oppose*	*Not Sure*
Every country should develop special teams of commandos who are experts at capturing terrorists while saving the lives of hostages.			
USA	89%	5%	6%
Great Britain	85	5	10
All airline service should be cut off to and from any country which allows terrorists to use that country as a base of training or operations, or which gives refuge to terrorists or lets them go free.			
USA	79	11	10
Great Britain	67	20	13
A special world force should be organized which would operate in any country of the world and which would investigate terrorist groups, arrest them, and put their leaders and members to death.			
USA	55	29	16
Great Britain	66	19	15
All those caught committing acts of terror should be convicted and given the death penalty.			
USA	55	31	14
Great Britain	71	15	14
Countries should refuse to make any concessions to terrorists, such as paying ransoms or freeing other terrorists from prison, even if this means people who are kidnapped or held hostage end up being killed by the terrorists.			
USA	51	31	18
Great Britain	65	18	17

Spain—REOP: *Which of the methods I am going to read to you would constitute, in your opinion, the most effective means towards avoiding hijackings and captures?* (Oct./Dec. 1972*)

Never give in to the demands of the captors	18%
Study the case thoroughly and make concessions so as to prevent worse	23
Respond with the same violence	3
Present the problems of the hijackers to the UN, so that their case may be heard	12
Isolate the country that shelters, protects, or aids them	11
Mete out exemplary punishment to the captors	25
Others	2
No answer	5

West Germany—DMS: *Do you fundamentally favor or oppose the introduction of the death penalty for terrorists?* (Aug. 1976)

Favor	*Oppose*	*Undecided*
55%	29%	16%

Great Britain—SOC: *Do you think that aircraft hijackers should or should not be surrendered to the countries from which they hijack planes?*

	May 1973	*Nov. 1977*
Should	74%	81%
Should not	9	8
Don't know	17	11

Some countries refuse to hand over hijackers. Do you think that all other countries should stop all air communications with such countries or not?

	May 1973	*Nov. 1977*
Should	43%	47%
Should not	29	33
Don't know	28	20

Side Effects of the Battle Against Terrorists

Spain—REOP: *As you know, there has been an attempted kidnaping with victims at the Olympic Games. Who do you believe is principally responsible for these events?* (Oct./Dec. 1972*)

The Munich police who attempted a surprise attack and fired first	12%
The Palestinian terrorists who took the Israeli athletes hostage	42
The Israeli athletes in trying to defend themselves and fighting their aggressors	3
The State of Israel for refusing to negotiate	15
Deficiency of the security system at the Munich olympics	14
Other	3
No answer	11

When comparing the events at Munich and the reprisals taken by the State of Israel against communities of Palestinian refugees, which has made the deeper impression upon you? (Oct./Dec. 1972*)

The Munich massacre	52%
The reprisals of the State of Israel	39
No answer	10

Netherlands—NIPO: *Do you believe the South Moluccans should be placed under strict surveillance, even though our country might then somewhat resemble a police state?* (July 1977)

In favor of strict surveillance	62%
Opposed to strict surveillance	33
No opinion	5

Do you feel that terrorists such as hijackers of trains and members of the German Baader-Meinhof group should have the same rights as other arrested suspects in our country, or do you believe they are not entitled to such rights? (Oct. 1977*)

	Same Rights as Other Suspects	*Cannot Claim Equal Rights*	*No Answer*
All	49%	44%	7%
Women	48	43	9
Men	50	46	4

Do you think that extra stern and harsh action should be taken against such terrorists, or should they be dealt with in the same manner as other criminals?

	Extra Stern, Harsh Action	*Same as Other Criminals*	*No Answer*
All	73%	21%	6%
Women	72	20	8
Men	73	23	4

West Germany—DMS: *The trial at Stammheim of the terrorists Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe was recently completed. What is your impression: Do you feel it was generally a fair trial, that is, did the prisoners and their lawyers have every opportunity for a proper defense, or were they hindered in any way?* (May 1977)

Fair trial	60%
Defense obstructed	10
Impossible to say	30

If the influence of the state and the police has to be strengthened in order to combat terrorism, would you go along with limitations of your personal rights by such measures as surveillance and house searches, or would you reject this?

	May 1975	*Feb. 1978**						
	All	*All*	*Men*	*Women*	*16–29 Years*	*30–44 Years*	*45–59 Years*	*60 and Over*
Would accept	69	62	60	64	51	67	63	67
Would reject	21	26	30	22	36	23	25	19
Undecided; no opinion	10	12	10	14	13	10	12	14

In the discussion of effective ways of fighting terrorism, the question is raised whether the conversations between the accused and their lawyers should be supervised. Some are against supervision because they feel it is part of a fair trial to enable a prisoner to talk confidentially with his lawyer. Others are for supervising conversations with the defense as they feel this is the best way of preventing new acts of terrorism from being organized in and from the prison. How do you feel about this? (May 1977)

For supervision of the defense	64%
Against supervision	22
Undecided	14

West Germany—EMNID: *After the suicides of terrorists in several penitentiaries, it is being considered to have the cells of the terrorists constantly watched. Some people are in favor of this measure in order to prevent further suicides, others oppose it because it would offend human dignity. Which of these views comes closest to your own feeling?* (Nov./Dec. 1977*)

		Age				
	Total	*14–19*	*20–29*	*30–49*	*50–64*	*65 and Over*
Keep under constant observation so as to prevent further suicides	54%	46%	51%	53%	59%	57%
No constant observation, as it offends human dignity	44	51	45	45	39	40
No answer	3	3	4	2	2	4

The Role of the News Media

USA—AIPO: *Some people say the news media place too much emphasis on the reporting of terrorism such as kidnapings, the holding of hostages, and the like. Others say that such reporting is necessary to keep people fully informed. Which point of view comes closest to your own opinion on this issue?* (April 1977*)

	Terrorism Is Overemphasized	*Public Should Be Made Aware*	*No Opinion*
National	47%	50%	3%
Men	51	46	3
Women	43	54	3
Whites	50	48	2
Nonwhites	24	67	9
Under 30	37	61	2
30–49	55	42	3
50 and over	48	48	4

Do you think news media coverage of terrorism encourages others to commit these acts, or not? (April 1977*)

	Yes	*No*	*No Opinion*
National	64%	27%	9%
College	71	21	8
High school	65	28	7
Grade school	52	33	15

West Germany—DMS: *A few days after Schleyer was kidnapped, the Federal Government imposed a news embargo. Very generally speaking, do you agree or disagree with this news embargo?* (Sept. 1977)

Agree	77%
Disagree	13
Undecided, no answer	10

Sympathizers

West Germany—DMS: *Some people say that one has to be careful nowadays in the Federal Republic with what one says; one always has to be afraid of being misunderstood and of being at once suspected of sympathizing with the terrorists. Do you think that is correct, or wouldn't you say so?* (Jan. 1978*)

Disagree	67%
Is correct	21
Undecided	12

Do you believe the sympathizers come from all ranks of society, or are there certain ranks or circles which are close to the terrorists? (Jan. 1978*)

From all ranks of population	47%
Certain ranks of circles	43
Don't know	10

What are the circles you believe the sympathizers mainly come from; that is, where do the terrorists especially find their aiders and abetters? Could you tell me on the basis of this list? (Only asked when the answer to the previous question was "certain ranks or circles." Jan. 1978*)

Students	38%
Lawyers	32
Communists	23
College professors	18
Authors	12
Rightist radicals, former Nazis	10
Young Socialists	9
Teachers	8
Artists, actors	7
Journalists	7
Certain groups in the Socialist Party	6
Labor unions	2
Certain groups in the Liberal Party	2
Nobody from these circles	1

(multiple answers)

In the newspapers and on television a great deal is now being said about the so-called sympathetic environment of the terrorists, but the question is who should be counted among the sympathizers and who shouldn't. Let me read a few examples to you. Would you please tell me for each if such a person, in your opinion, is or is not a sympathizer. (Jan. 1978*)

A sympathizer is:

Somebody who gives shelter to a terrorist in his home	95%
Somebody who recognizes a terrorist but doesn't report him to the police	73
Somebody who gives money, like the people who contributed to the dental treatment for Gudrun Ensslin	68
Somebody who makes endeavors toward getting prison conditions for terrorists alleviated	67
A person who feels pity for the terrorists because he believes them to perpetrate these crimes out of sheer despair	56
A person who considers the terrorists' criticism of our society justified in some respects	36
A person who believes the lawyers should have the right at all times to visit the terrorists in prison	29
A person who does not wish the death penalty introduced for terrorists	18
None of these	2

(multiple answers)